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ABSTRACT. In this paper we report a study of the
approach of six U.K. water and electricity companies
towards managing the relationship with their ‘green’
stakeholders. Stakeholders are accorded increasing
importance in political discourse and stakeholder
theory is emerging as a promising framework for the
analysis of corporate social performance.
We studied the companies’ general approach
towards green stakeholders, their dealings with specific
stakeholder groups and whether they emphasised the
consultation or the information aspect of stakeholder
management. We found that none of the six com-
panies had a systematic stakeholder approach that
extended to all potential green stakeholders. Rather,
the importance of specific stakeholder groups seemed
to be determined by managers’ intuition and by the
stance that the stakeholders themselves displayed
towards the company.
Green stakeholders with an institutional power base
– government via legislation, environmental and
industry regulators – emerged as the most immedi-
ately influential stakeholders. The Environment
Agency, the environmental regulator, played an espe-
cially important role in the companies’ environmental
management. Customers and the general public – the
source of corporate social legitimacy – were also con-
sidered to be important, but their influence was more
long term and based on voice, rather than the poten-
tial for direct retaliation. Economic stakeholders were
generally considered to be not very interested in the
companies’ environmental performance. 
Introduction 
Environmental concerns are frequently at the
top of the list of social expectations a company
has to face. The demand from a diversity of
sources for environmentally sensitive business
practices is increasingly difficult to ignore. Yet,
environmental issues are often complex, different
environmental considerations may be at odds
with each other, and it is not easy for managers
to decide which environmental problems
deserve priority in the face of limited company
resources.
Similar problems of defining issues and
deciding on priorities are, of course, typical for
social issues management in general. Companies
often resort to stakeholder consultation to resolve
conflicting interests (Zadek, 1998) and stake-
holder theory is increasingly being used by
scholars to explain companies’ social performance
(Ullmann, 1985; Roberts, 1992; Clarkson, 1995;
Litz, 1996; Mitchell et al., 1997). Similarly, the
environmental management literature tends to
place some importance on stakeholder consulta-
tion (e.g. Shrivastava, 1994; Stead and Stead,
1996). Starik (1995) even goes as far as suggesting
that the environment should be considered a
stakeholder in its own right.
Literature review 
The relationship between a company and its
stakeholders can be conceptualised in terms of
agency theory (Donaldson, 1982; Hill and Jones,
1992; Jones, 1995), where firms can be seen as
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a nexus of (explicit or implicit) contracts between
their top managers and other stakeholders,
including shareholders. Woodward et al. (1996)
suggest that this – implicit – principal-agent
contract between a company and its non-owner
stakeholders rests on the concept of social legit-
imacy and obliges the company to report on its
social performance.
A number of authors have conceptualised the
relationship between stakeholder attributes, the
extent of a company’s stakeholder orientation
and the company’s social performance. Ullmann
(1985) suggests that (a) stakeholder power is
positively correlated with social performance, and
(b) companies that use an active posture to influ-
encing the organisation’s relationship with key
stakeholders achieve higher social performance.
Wood (1991) and Clarkson (1995) argue that it
is possible to analyse and evaluate a company’s
corporate performance partly by looking at the
way it manages relationships with its stakeholders.
Logsdon and Yuthas (1997) suggest that compa-
nies go through stages of moral development,
similar to the stages of individual moral devel-
opment proposed by Kohlberg, and that the
sophistication of the company’s stakeholder
orientation can serve to determine the stage of
corporate moral development.
It is also recognised that in practice not all
company – stakeholder relationships tend to be
seen as equally important by managers. Some
efforts have therefore gone into conceptualising
the relationship between the attributes of various
stakeholder groups and the attention they receive
from managers. Mitchell et al. (1997) identified
three dimensions of stakeholder salience for
managers: (a) the power that a particular stake-
holder group is perceived to hold, (b) the legit-
imacy that the stakeholder group is considered
to have, and (c) the perceived urgency of the
stakeholder group’s demands. They argued that
managers would pay most attention to the expec-
tations of stakeholder groups that were perceived
to show all three attributes and least to those
stakeholders exhibiting only one dimension. A
slightly different framework is suggested by
Freeman (1984) and Huse and Eide (1996), who
suggest that stakeholder power and influence can
be based in one of several of the following: a
formal or institutionalised basis; an economic
basis; or a societal legitimacy basis. Rowley
(1997) suggested that stakeholder influence is not
only determined by the attributes of individual
stakeholder groups but also by the way in which
different stakeholder groups interact and form
networks. Companies which were subjected to
the attention of multiple stakeholders were likely
to show stronger social performance, particularly
if these stakeholder groups co-ordinated their
efforts.
Freeman (1984) advocates that stakeholder
considerations be incorporated into traditional
strategic planning approaches. He proposes a four
step stakeholder management process: (1) iden-
tification of all relevant stakeholder groups in
relation to the issue being addressed; (2) deter-
mining the stake and importance of each stake-
holder group; (3) determining how effectively
the needs or expectations of each group are
currently being met by the company; and (4)
modification of corporate policies and priorities
to take into consideration stakeholder interests
that are not currently met. Polonsky (1995), as
well as Altman and Petkus (1994) point out that
the stakeholder management process involves
both consultation and information and Hosmer
(1994) argues that companies can rely on their
stakeholders not only for co-operation but also
for innovative developments and advice.
There is a growing body of empirical studies
on stakeholder theory and management. Lerner
and Fryxell (1994) studied the relationship
between CEOs’ stakeholder attitudes and a
company’s social activities and found it to be only
minor. Greenley and Foxall (1997) found some
relation between stakeholder orientation and a
company’s financial performance but this was
dependent on a number of other factors, Dooley
and Lerner (1994) found that CEOs’ concern for
stakeholder expectations was significantly influ-
enced by the company’s financial performance.
Frost (1995) found that stakeholder analysis
provided a useful tool for understanding ethical
issues surrounding the mining industry in
Australia. Sillanpää (1998) provides a case study
of the Body Shop’s approach to integrating stake-
holder values in its social auditing process.
Generally, empirical work into stakeholder ori-
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entation and management shows a great diversity
of topics studied and, perhaps due to the newness
of the field and the relatively small body of
literature available, little attempt to build sys-
tematically on previous findings or theoretical
work in the field.
In an article that is relatively closely related
to the work reported here, Fineman and Clarke
(1996) studied how companies in four different
industries looked at environmental stakeholder
groups, and identified four groups of environ-
mental stakeholders: (1) groups whose manifest
mission it is to care for the planet (national and
local green pressure groups and individual cham-
pions); (2) regulators and government; (3) stake-
holders with vicarious green interests (financial
shareholders, customers, suppliers, and the
media); and (4) internal stakeholders. Their
findings suggested that companies may be more
willing to engage with those green stakeholder
groups that they find co-operative and non-
threatening to the company’s activities. They
concluded that this tendency may limit the envi-
ronmental changes that companies feel compelled
to undertake.
Research questions 
The present study looks at the drivers of envi-
ronmental change (“corporate greening”) in a
number of U.K. water and electricity companies.
It examines the perceived importance of various
potential green stakeholder groups and the ways
in which companies interact with them. As a
theoretical framework for the research we use
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) three-dimensional model
of stakeholder power, legitimacy and urgency.
More specifically the article looks at the fol-
lowing questions: 
• What is the general attitude of managers
towards environmental stakeholders? 
• How do they approach the management of
environmental stakeholder relationships? 
• What stakeholder groups are perceived as
most important by managers? 
• How is this perceived importance related to
perceived stakeholder power, legitimacy and
urgency? 
Methodology 
This research is based on a comparative case study
methodology and follows largely the qualitative
methods suggested by Miles and Huberman
(1994). While each case in a comparative case
study is by necessity treated in less detail than a
single case study, “multiple cases offer the
research a [. . .] deeper understanding of
processes and outcomes of cases, the chance to
test (not just develop) hypotheses, and a good
picture of locally grounded causality” (Miles and
Huberman, 1994), p. 26.
Data was gathered in six U.K. water and elec-
tricity companies. These recently privatised
utilities are thought to constitute a good ‘test
bed’ for our research, as we assume that they
started from relatively similar positions at the
time of privatisation and have since had the
opportunity to develop differently, for example,
in the area of environmental management. So
while we expect that companies in these indus-
tries do things differently, they will at the same
time have a relatively similar history, thus making
them comparable.
We carried out case studies in two water and
sewerage companies, two regional electricity
companies (RECs – companies set up to deal
with electricity distribution although some have
invested in limited generation capacity), and two
multi-utility companies, comprising both water
and electricity utilities. On the basis of company
publications, such as annual reports and envi-
ronmental reports, independent studies, press
reports, and personal contacts, we identified
companies which were thought to have reached
different stages in their environmental manage-
ment and ‘greening’ process. Considerations of
access and physical location also influenced the
final choice of companies. For competitive
reasons the companies did not want to be iden-
tified in this article and are referred to as Water
1, Water 2, Electricity 1, Electricity 2, Multi-
utility 1 and Multi-utility 2. While top managers
at all the companies made it a condition of
participating that we would not divulge any
competitively sensitive information no restric-
tions on reporting were made in practice,
presumably because the questions we asked were
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not considered to touch commercially sensitive
areas.
Data was gathered mainly through semi-struc-
tured interviews, augmented by documents such
as policy documents, environmental performance
reports, strategy documents, and similar. In each
company we interviewed between 12 and 15
individuals, selected from different levels in the
organisational structure and hierarchy. Our
respondents were chosen through theoretical and
snow-ball sampling and included group directors,
group environmental and other staff, divisional
directors and senior managers and divisional
environmental staff. Details of the number and
position of respondents in each company is given
in Appendix 1. Respondents’ demographics, such
as age, gender or ethnic background were not
considered relevant in the context of our study,
where the focus was on attitudes prevailing
within and across organisations. (But Appendix
1 does give some indication of respondents’
gender and whether they had worked in the
company since before privatisation or joined
afterwards. Of our sixty respondents only one
was non-white and only five were women. This
reflects the traditional composition of these com-
panies rather than any sampling bias.) 
Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and
two hours. As a general rule interviews were
tape recorded and fully transcribed. In a small
number of cases, however, this was not possible.
Interviews 17, 29 and 40 were our first contacts
with senior and top managers of the respective
companies, designed to negotiate access as well
as gather information. Tape recording did not
seem appropriate in these cases. In three cases the
respondents were not happy to be tape recorded
(interviews 31, 38, 54) and in three cases back-
ground noises made recording impossible (inter-
views 11, 33, 37). In these cases extensive notes,
running to several pages, were taken during and
immediately after the interviews. While this
obviously misses out some detail of the responses
we feel that our notes were extensive enough
so that the lack of tape recording in these cases
did not affect the analysis significantly. Short
second interviews (sometimes via telephone)
were carried out with some key respondents,
mostly group environmental managers, to clarify
factual questions. We did not feel it was neces-
sary to have second interviews with the majority
of our respondents as factual questions could
generally be clarified by the environmental
manager. As interviews were of different lengths
and took somewhat different routes depending
on the background and interests of the individual
respondents, having second interviews with some
respondents but not with others would not
appear to have impacted on the analysis in any
significant way.
Analysis consisted of searches for themes
related to stakeholder management and within-
case and between-case comparisons as suggested
by Eisenhardt (1989) and Miles and Huberman
(1994). To this we added some comparisons
between the two industries from which our cases
were drawn. A matrix display and analysis
(Miles and Huberman, 1994) was carried out
and some of the matrix tables are shown in the
results sections of the article. Throughout the
analysis we decided to work with words rather
than convert them into numbers through
content analysis as “[. . .] although words may
be more unwieldy than numbers they render
more meaning than numbers” (Miles and
Huberman, 1994). Content analysis (Holsti,
1969; Krippendorff, 1980) which focuses solely
on the numbers can easily shift attention from
substance to arithmetic and while probably
suitable to the analysis of large quantities of
documents would seem to run somewhat to
counter the essence of qualitative field study.
General green stakeholder approach 
Managers in all six companies mentioned at least
some green stakeholders and recognised that the
company needed to address the concerns of these
groups.1 This recognition seemed to be grounded
in three different streams of thinking. One was
the realisation that certain stakeholder groups
could have a significant negative effect on the
company if not taken into account.2 The second
rationale was an emerging realisation that certain
stakeholders can also affect the company’s envi-
ronmental management positively, for instance
through giving advice on issues where the stake-
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holder had particular expertise, such as wildlife
management,3 or by reinforcing the company’s
credibility with other stakeholders, for instance
in the case of a regulator supporting a water
company’s campaign to persuade the general
public to consume less water.4 The third ratio-
nale was a feeling that addressing stakeholder
needs was morally the right thing to do.5 This
seemed to apply particularly to the local com-
munity and the company’s customers.
At the same time, the companies in our study
did not appear to have a very systematic approach
to stakeholder management in general and envi-
ronmental stakeholder management specifically.
Some managers felt that their company in general
did not have a very clear idea who their stake-
holders were and what was the best way to
approach them or, indeed who the audiences for
their environmental performance reports were.6
While companies had regular contacts with
some stakeholders, particularly where these were
required by legislation, this regularity did not
extend to all stakeholders. Managers sometimes
expressed the feeling that their environmental
stakeholder management process should be more
systematic.7 Yet, at the time of the interviews
none of the companies interviewed seemed to
have developed an environmental stakeholder
map, made a systematic attempt to determine the
importance of each stakeholder group or initi-
ated a systematic consultation process that
included all relevant stakeholders. These findings
are summarised in Table I.
Managers identified a number of organisations
or groups that they considered to have some
interest in environmental issues. These were the
British parliament and government and the
European Commission and parliament through
legislation and regulatory frameworks,8 industrial
(OFWAT and OFFER)9 and environmental
regulators (Environment Agency),10 other state
regulators and agencies (English Nature, English
Heritage, the Countryside Commission),11 local
authorities,12 shareholders,13 employees,14 cus-
tomers,15 investors and City analysts,16 the local
community,17 the general public,18 wildlife trusts19
and local and national pressure groups.20
Stakeholder power 
The question of stakeholder power was briefly
discussed above. Ullmann (1985) argued that
stakeholder power was positively related to a
company’s social performance. In an argument
that goes back to Weber’s thoughts on social
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TABLE I
General stakeholder approach
Water 1 Water 2 Electricity 1 Electricity 2 Multi-utility 1 Multi-utility 2
Stakeholder needs Int. 1 Int. 9, 10 Int. 18, 20, Int. 30, 32, Int. 40, 42, 43 Int. 57, 58
recognised 21, 22 34
Potential negative impact Int. 1 Int. 10, 11 Int. 20, Int. 32, 34, Int. 41, 46, 56 Int. 57, 59
of stakeholders 26, 27 38
Potential positive impact Int. 43 
of stakeholders
It is morally right to Int. 1, Int. 9, Int. 17, 18, Int. 29, 32, Int. 40, 42
address stakeholder needs 2, 3 11, 12 19, 20 35
Unclear about stakeholder Int. 18 Int. 30 Int. 42
needs & approach
Stakeholder management 
should be more systematic Int. 9 Int. 18 Int. 30 Int. 42
dominance, Freeman (1984) suggested that stake-
holder power could have (a) a formal or institu-
tionalised basis, (b) an economic basis or (c) a
social legitimacy basis, whereas Mitchell et al.
(1996) saw stakeholder power as different from
stakeholder legitimacy.
Throughout our research it became apparent
that managers tended to consider stakeholders
with institutionalised power as most immediately
influential. Legislation was a powerful driver for
environmental management. This was particularly
true for the water companies, which were faced
with significant European environmental legisla-
tion (Urban Waste Water Directive, Bathing
Waters Directive, etc.). Compliance with this
legislation was written into their operating
licenses and the necessary capital expenditures
agreed with the industry regulator, OFWAT.
The regional electricity companies, distribu-
tors of electricity as opposed to generators,
faced considerably less specific environmental
legislation. Compliance with legal obligations
was therefore considered to be a less challenging
part of environmental management and some
managers in the sector saw this as the
absolute minimum that they must achieve.21 The
need to comply with legislation was widely
accepted by our respondents, although some
felt that certain legislative requirements could
be somewhat inappropriate. For instance,
respondents in Multi-utility 1 stated that their
customers and they themselves felt that the
elimination of foul-flooding was more important
than cleaning up bathing waters but that existing
legislation demanded that the latter take priority
over the former.22
Legislation is personified in the regulatory
bodies whose task it is to enforce it. In accor-
dance with the importance of legislation in
driving environmental management, managers
tended to consider the Environment Agency, the
U.K. environmental regulatory body as their
most immediate and tangible environmental
stakeholder. While prosecution by the EA was
often mentioned, particularly by managers in the
water & sewerage industry, as the most likely
stakeholder retaliation that the companies faced,23
many of our respondents explicitly stressed that
the relationship with the Agency tended to be
co-operative24 rather than threatening or adver-
sarial. However, this opinion was more evident
in companies that got few prosecutions than
in those (some water companies in particular)
that had been heavily prosecuted by the EA for
breaching discharge licences. Managers in
Electricity 1 also thought that the EA was quite
stretched in terms of resources and relied on
companies’ co-operation to be able to prosecute
them at all.25
Industry regulators are the companies’ other
stakeholder with a clearly institutionalised power
base. These regulating bodies were set up at the
time of the privatisation of the U.K. water and
electricity industries to safeguard the interests of
consumers and society. Managers by and large
agreed that the industry regulators had a signif-
icant influence on the environmental manage-
ment of their companies, mostly by setting price
and investment levels for the companies. While
the regulators thus effectively determined the
level of environmental expenditure, our respon-
dents did not generally feel that the regulators
were themselves driven by environmental
concerns beyond the requirements of the law.
Rather the main concern of both the water and
the electricity regulator was to keep prices down
for consumers. Some managers in the water
industry suggested that this resulted in conflicting
goals between the Environment Agency and the
industry regulator. While they felt that the EA
would like to see them do more in terms of
environmental protection and go beyond legal
requirements, the industry regulator was con-
cerned about the rising cost to consumers that
the heavy capital investment entailed and wanted
to steer in the other direction. Managers felt that
their companies were caught in the middle but
implied that, ultimately, they had to follow their
industry regulators.
Shareholders and investors were seen to be in
a powerful situation relative to the company but
only marginally interested in environmental
issues, although some managers felt that there
was an awakening interest. One environmental
manager described how her original appointment
had been triggered by questions from major
shareholders.26 However, most managers felt
that the majority of shareholders had no urgent
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interest in environmental issues and was more
concerned with a reasonable return on invest-
ment.27 Shareholder expectations, not unlike
those of the industry regulators, thus impacted
on environmental management more in the sense
of a limiting force. City analysts and investors
were generally seen in a similar vein. Some
managers testified to the occasional interest from
ethical and environmental investment funds28 and
managers in Electricity 2 thought that investment
analysts in general were slowly waking up to the
idea that a company’s environmental performance
could be an important factor in making future
investment decisions.29
Customers in general have relatively little
direct power over the companies in this study, as
these still are in a near monopoly situation
(despite some steps to make the electricity
market, in particular, more competitive being
taken by the U.K. government). Domestic cus-
tomers are, however, seen as having very high
legitimacy, as will be discussed in the next
section. Large industrial and commercial cus-
tomers of electricity have a wider choice of
potential suppliers and thus more economic
power vis-à-vis companies but our respondents
in the electricity industry thought that these
customers were not particularly interested in the
green credentials of their electricity supplier,
making their purchasing decisions based on price,
and to some extent service.30 Large customers are
the most obvious target for demand side man-
agement (the deliberate attempt by a company
to reduce demand for their product, particularly
at peak times) and managers in Electricity 1
were reporting first steps in that direction.31 In
the overall scheme of things, however, large
customers were regarded as a marginal green
stakeholder.
All in all, it seems to us that stakeholders with
an institutional power base, such as government
through legislation and both environmental and
economic regulators are by far the most imme-
diately influential green stakeholders of the
companies studied. This varied to some extent
between the two industries, in so far as legisla-
tion emerged as a more important environmental
driver for the water companies than the elec-
tricity companies. It also varied to some extent
between companies in the same sector. Where
managers felt the company had compliance
issues under control, there seemed to be more
emphasis on other green stakeholders, most
notably customers, local communities and the
general public.32 These findings are summarised
in Table II.
Stakeholder legitimacy 
The stakeholders with institutionalised or
economic power, identified above, were gener-
ally also considered to be legitimate. However,
an equation of institutional power and perceived
legitimacy is not automatic. This was illustrated
in one comment by a manager in Water 2, who
suggested that the industry regulator ultimately
derived his authority from representing consumer
interests and that, as soon as he ceased to repre-
sent these interests adequately, he would also lose
legitimacy as a stakeholder.33 Similarly, the legit-
imacy of shareholders’ and investors’ interests in
the company, including its environmental man-
agement, were not really questioned by any of
the managers. However, several respondents
stated that, due to the recent public service back-
ground of the industries, shareholders were still
a relatively new and unfamiliar concern to
them.34 Some also suggested that the legitimacy
of shareholder interests was not equally fully
accepted by the general public, as evidenced by
the widespread hostility that the privatisation of
the water and electricity industries in 1989 had
sparked.35
The public service background of the indus-
tries may also explain why the majority of
respondents seemed to feel that the stakeholders
with the highest legitimacy were their customers,
local communities and society or the public in
general. In fact, many managers would say that
these were their most important stakeholders.36
Due to the effective monopoly situation of these
companies, the general public as well as local
communities were also their customers, as were
their own employees and indeed any pressure
groups. Thus managers often spoke of customers
and the general public interchangeably.
Customers and the local community were
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consulted regularly by most companies, often
over local issues, such as planning permissions or
nuisance caused by the company’s activities.37
The water division of Multi-utility 2 felt they
had gone furthest in their consultation of cus-
tomers in conducting a survey of all their cus-
tomers which, among other things, helped them
to determine priorities for discretionary envi-
ronmental investments.38
Despite managers’ frequently stated concern
for ‘the general public’ or ‘society’, this seemed
quite an ill-defined term and managers seemed
to regard them largely as an homogenous mass
with little differentiation between groups. The
only differentiation occurred when respondents
talked about local communities. In their role as
members of a local community, members of the
public became more clearly defined and identi-
fiable to managers. Companies tended to come
into contact with local communities over specific
issues, for instance during the planning phase of
a new projects, such as a sewage treatment works
or an electricity sub-station, or over specific
concerns, such as odour, noise, or electromag-
netic fields. It was in their dealings with local
communities where managers frequently seemed
to have the clearest idea of stakeholder expecta-
tions and methods of establishing and main-
taining regular contacts. There were certain legal
obligations in terms of involvement of local
groups in the planning process for new projects,
but many managers told us that they had devel-
oped a more regular process, where they tried
to gauge the communities’ attitudes very early in
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TABLE II
Stakeholder Power 
Water 1 Water 2 Electricity 1 Electricity 2 Multi-utility 1 Multi-utility 2
Legislators as powerful Int. 1, Int. 9, Int. 18, 19, Int. 29, 30, Int. 40, 41, Int. 58, 59, 60
stakeholders 2, 3, 5, 10, 11 20, 21, 22, 31, 32, 34, 42, 43, 46, 
7, 8 24, 26 37, 38 51, 55
Legislative requirements Int. 17, 
are minimum standard 18, 19
to be achieved
Environment agency as Int. 1, Int. 10, 11, Int. 19, 20, Int. 34, Int. 41, 42, Int. 57, 58, 
powerful stakeholder 2, 3, 4, 12, 14, 21, 22, 37, 38 43, 44, 45, 59, 60
5, 6, 8 15, 16 26, 27 46, 52, 54
Environment agency Int. 1, Int. 10, 12, Int. 26, 27 Int. 31, Int. 41, 43, Int. 57, 60
sanctions most likely 3, 7, 8 14, 15 32, 37 44, 46, 56
stakeholder retaliation
Industry regulators are Int. 1, 2, Int. 9, 10, Int. 18, Int. 29, 30, Int. 42, 43, 45, Int. 57, 58, 59
powerful stakeholders 3, 4, 5, 6 11, 13, 15 20, 23 32, 34 48, 51, 54, 56
Shareholders/owners as Int. 1, Int. 14 Int. 17, 18, Int. 30, 31 Int. 40, 42, 43 Int. 57
influential stakeholders 7, 8 20, 28
Shareholders/owners are Int. 1, 8 Int. 17, 20, Int. 30, Int. 40, 43
not very interested in 26 31, 32
environmental issues
Good compliance record Int. 1, 2, Int. 17, 18, 
leads to less focus 3, 7, 8 19, 20
on regulator as 
environmental stakeholder
the planning process or on a regular basis, in
order to identify problems early and also to bring
over the company’s position on certain issues.
One stakeholder group whose legitimacy was
questioned by a number of managers was the
media. They were often considered to be hostile
and unfair to the companies, particularly in the
reporting on water shortages and leakage (water
industry), perceived public health risks of elec-
tromagnetic fields (electricity industry) or post-
privatisation executive salaries.39 Keeping the
company out of the headlines was often men-
tioned as one purpose of good environmental
management.40 Thus managers said they would
generally try and avoid the media, unless they
were approached in a way that made it impos-
sible not to reply. One of our respondents said
that he did not regard the media as a stakeholder
of the company at all.41
Occasionally a respondent would question the
legitimacy of environmental pressure groups,
although the reaction differed considerably
between different types of interest groups.
Generally, the more mainstream and broad-based
a pressure group was perceived to be by managers
the more legitimacy it was considered to have.
For instance, local wildlife trusts generally were
considered as highly legitimate by managers in
the water companies (due to their large land-
holdings these companies have a special legal
obligation to engage in comprehensive land man-
agement for conservation and recreation).42
Companies co-operated with these trusts and
used their expertise in managing company owned
land. Similarly, national environmental pressure
groups, such as Friends of the Earth or the
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB)
were generally considered to be legitimate stake-
holders by managers, who perceived them to
be ‘reasonable’ and co-operative’. A number of
managers felt that such pressure groups had a
valuable role to play for society in general43 and
could also be beneficial in keeping the company
‘on its toes’ in terms of environmental commit-
ment, mostly due to their influence on public
opinion.44 Concerns regarding legitimacy were
raised mostly about pressure groups that appeared
to be hostile45 or that were seen to have a very
narrow agenda and thus failed to appreciate the
wider picture within which managers felt they
had to operate.46
Companies preferred to deal with stakeholders
who they perceived to be co-operative and
non-threatening. They had more regular contacts
with such stakeholders and said they were more
prepared to share company internal information
with them in order to get the stakeholders’ views
and possibly advice. This confirms the findings
of Fineman and Clarke (1996). Findings con-
cerning the perceived legitimacy of stakeholders
are summarised in Table III.
Urgency of stakeholder claims 
Our respondents generally regarded the demands
made by government (through legislation) and by
the Environment Agency as urgent, in the sense
that these were demands that they had to comply
with within a given time frame. Apart from that
issues that were of major public concern, such
as electromagnetic fields,47 water shortages and
leakage48 and sewage disposal,49 and were conse-
quently taken up by the press and by environ-
mental pressure groups, also seemed to be
considered as relatively urgent.
Several stakeholder groups were thought not
to have very urgent environmental claims
although they might be considered highly legit-
imate or to possess significant potential power.
One of these were the companies’ shareholders
or owners, who were not considered to be very
interested in environmental issues by most
respondents.50
A rather confused picture emerged concerning
the perceived environmental interest and aware-
ness of customers, both domestic and industrial.
Practically all members of the local public are also
the companies’ customers. However, that does
not mean that people necessarily have the same
priorities or act in the same way in their simul-
taneous roles as customers, members of the local
community and members of the general public.51
Managers frequently suggested that they got a
message of significant environmental concern
from the general public and the local communi-
ties.52 However, as customers, the same people
could be less concerned about the companies’
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environmental performance, certainly if that
meant higher bills.53 Perhaps as a consequence,
managers tended to state that customers were a
very important environmental stakeholder but at
the same time had little clear idea of any envi-
ronmental actions demanded by customers. A
number of managers also complained that cus-
tomers/the public had little real understanding of
the way in which water or electricity companies
worked or of the environmental issues concerned
and that their views and demands were there-
fore often not very well founded.54 Managers
seemed to place more emphasis on informing and
‘educating’ the public and customers than they
did with other stakeholders.
A similar status of high legitimacy but unclear
urgency of environmental claims seemed to
adhere to companies’ employees. While some
managers considered employees to be generally
interested in green issues and thought that
working for a company with a good environ-
mental record was motivating for many
employees,55 other respondents suggested that
employees were generally not particularly well
informed about or interested in environmental
issues and were not easily motivated to take
account of environmental issues in their work.56
The impression that managers had of their
employees’ motivation for environmental man-
agement seemed to vary considerably between
companies. For instance, Water 2 used employee
participation in environmental actions and ‘green
groups’ as an employee motivation tool and
managers claimed that it worked well in that
respect. Generally, managers in the water com-
panies felt that a large number of their employees
was intrinsically interested in environmental
issues, which was the reason why they had
chosen to work for the water authority.57
Despite their potential power international or
national environmental pressure groups, such as
Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth, were not
considered a particularly urgent environmental
stakeholder by most respondents.58 None of our
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TABLE III
Perceived legitimacy of stakeholders 
Water 1 Water 2 Electricity 1 Electricity 2 Multi-utility 1 Multi-utility 2
Industry regulator receives Int. 9
legitimacy from customers
Shareholders are Int. 15 Int. 17, Int. 29, 30 Int. 43
new concern 18, 28
Shareholder interest not Int. 2, 3 Int. 15 Int. 40, 43 Int. 57
fully accepted by public
Customers and community Int. 1, Int. 9, 10, Int. 17, Int. 30, 31, Int. 42, 43, Int. 57, 58, 59
are important stakeholders 2, 3, 5, 11, 12, 13, 18, 20, 22, 32, 36, 39 44, 48, 50, 
7, 8 15, 16 23, 24 51, 56
Customers and community Int. 1, 2 Int. 9, 10 Int. 17, Int. 29, Int. 43, Int. 57, 58
are most important 18, 20 30, 32 50, 51
stakeholders
Legitimacy of media as Int. 1 Int. 9 Int. 34 Int. 40, 41
stakeholder questioned
Wildlife groups are highly Int. 4, 6 Int. 9, Int. 42, 43 Int. 60
legitimate stakeholders 10, 14
Pressure groups derive Int. 1, Int. 9 Int. 17, 20 Int. 34 Int. 57
influence from 2, 5
public opinion
respondents felt that these organisations were
particularly interested in their companies. Some
managers in the water companies said that there
had been more interest in the past, when British
water authorities still dumped raw sewage into
the sea (a practice since discontinued through
European regulation) but that this interest had
diminished considerably.59 Many of our respon-
dents felt that the big environmental pressure
groups had ‘bigger fish to fry’ than local water
or electricity distribution companies. Some of
our respondents had had some informal contact
with members of Friends of the Earth or other
organisations60 but most seemed content not
to have attracted any unwanted attention from
these pressure groups. The findings regarding
urgency of stakeholder claims are summarised in
Table IV.
Summary and conclusion 
In the previous sections we examined the power,
legitimacy and urgency of a number of environ-
mental stakeholder groups as described by
managers in six companies in the U.K. water and
electricity industries. In summary, the following
findings were the most salient: 
• Stakeholders with an institutional power
base, such as government through legisla-
tion and environmental and industry regu-
lators, were seen to be most immediately
influential. These stakeholders were consid-
ered to have significant power, legitimacy
and urgency. 
• The demands of these stakeholders could
conflict with each other, in which case
companies followed those demands backed
up by legislation. 
• Customers and the public were considered
to be highly legitimate, and indirectly rather
powerful stakeholders, but their claims were
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TABLE IV
Urgency of stakeholder claims 
Water 1 Water 2 Electricity 1 Electricity 2 Multi-utility 1 Multi-utility 2
Issues of major public Int. 1, Int. 9, 10, Int. 17, 18, Int. 30, 34 Int. 41, 42, Int. 57, 58, 59
concern are considered 2, 3, 5 12, 15 19, 20, 43, 44, 45, 
as urgent 26, 27 46, 49, 51, 54
Public shows significant Int. 1, Int. 9, Int. 17, 19, Int. 31, Int. 40, 41, Int. 57, 59, 59
environmental concern 2, 3, 7 10, 12 20, 22, 26, 37, 38 42, 43, 46, 
27, 28 50, 51
Customers are reluctant Int. 2 Int. 10 Int. 17, Int. 34 Int. 40, 
to accept higher bills 20, 23 43, 50
for environmental 
protection
Employees show Int. 1 Int. 11, Int. 18, 19, Int. 31 Int. 41, 42 Int. 58
environmental concern 12, 14 20, 24, 26
Water employees 
show particular concern Int. 2, Int. 9, 11, Int. 40, 41, Int. 57, 
for environment 3, 6 12, 15 42, 43 58, 60
Pressure groups have no Int. 1, 2 Int. 9, 10 Int. 17, Int. 30, 32, Int. 58
urgent interest in water 18, 22 34, 35
or electricity companies
often seen to be neither very coherent nor
particularly urgent. Managers put more
emphasis on ‘educating’ these stakeholders
than they did with other groups. 
• Employees were also considered to be very
legitimate environmental stakeholders but
their power and the urgency of their envi-
ronmental claims was somewhat uncertain. 
• Shareholders and owners were considered
to be both powerful and legitimate but not
generally very interested in environmental
issues and consequently not a driver of envi-
ronmental management, except in a con-
straining sense. 
• There was a tendency to avoid potential
stakeholders that were considered to be
hostile and/or whose claim were not
thought to be fully legitimate. This applied
to sections of the media and some environ-
mental pressure groups. 
The overall picture that emerges is one of a
partial green stakeholder management process
where some green stakeholders receive a fair lot
of attention whereas others are not considered to
be very important. Within Logsdon and Yuthas’s
(1997) classification, this would put the compa-
nies in the study somewhere between the con-
ventional and the post-conventional stage. While
the requirements of the law clearly influence
stakeholder management (a sign of the conven-
tional stage), there is also evidence that compa-
nies give some consideration to stakeholder
claims which are not backed up by law (a sign
of the post-conventional stage). Public opinion
seemed to be as powerful a motivator as legisla-
tion to many managers. In the light of this one
might question whether a simple three-stage
model can really capture the essence of stake-
holder relations as exhibited by a firm, particu-
larly given the varying nature of stakeholder
backgrounds and claims.
All three dimensions of stakeholder influence
suggested by Mitchell et al. (1997) had an impact
on managers’ perceptions of, and reactions to,
different stakeholder groups. Stakeholders that
were seen to have significant power, legitimacy
and urgency – e.g. the Environmental Agency
and the industry regulators – were clearly given
high priority in the managers’ minds. Where
stakeholders only showed one of the three
dimensions clearly – e.g. customers or employees
with high legitimacy but limited perceived power
or urgency – managers tended to speak highly
of them, as seemed to befit their high perceived
legitimacy but these stakeholders seemed to have
only limited direct influence on managers’
actions.
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) framework thus seems
useful in interpreting managers’ constructions of
stakeholder influence in an environmental man-
agement context. It should perhaps be stressed
again here that our study only looked at the
way in which managers perceived stakeholder
power, legitimacy and urgency, not at any objec-
tive measurement of these three constructs.
Operationalising the three dimensions in a
way that would allow objective measurement
would seem to be very difficult and also perhaps
unnecessary, given that managers will respond
to their perceptions of stakeholder influence,
not any objective measurement outside this
perception.
Some questions remain about the extent to
which the three dimensions are independent of
each other. There seem to be a number of
instances where power and legitimacy may not
be all that easy to separate, although we have
also found instances where high perceived stake-
holder legitimacy was not accompanied by
an equally high perceived stakeholder power,
e.g. in the case of customers and employees.
Further research using the Mitchell et al. (1997)
model would improve our understanding of this
facet.
The results of this study suggest that stake-
holders who are not perceived to have power,
legitimacy and urgency are less likely to make
their claim on companies, regardless of how well
justified these demands may be. Stakeholders that
have no power to impose sanctions on com-
panies, that are not perceived to be legitimate –
which may just mean that they are non-tradi-
tional – or which don’t shout very loud may not
be totally ignored, but their claims are not likely
to be treated with the same seriousness.
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Stakeholder demands which are not yet well
established may go unheeded. Many environ-
mental issues may fall into this category, given
that environmental understanding is constantly
evolving and many issues have indeed not
yet gained widespread acceptance or been insti-
tutionalised into powerful and legitimate stake-
holder representation. This would explain the
often reported reluctance of companies to take
on board emerging environmental issues.
This raises some interesting questions, both
from a theoretical and from a managerial per-
spective. Could managers ensure a more equal
representation of all stakeholder concerns, by
adopting a systematic stakeholder consultation
process as recommended, for instance, by
Freeman (1984) and Hummels (1998) and which
some of our respondents were considering? If so,
would such a pro-active approach amount to the
‘corporate leadership’ in achieving ecological sus-
tainability which is frequently advocated by
writers on sustainable business and corporate
environmental management (e.g. Post, 1991;
Roome, 1992; Schmidheiny, 1992; Shrivastava,
1994; Stead and Stead, 1996 and many others)?
What would be the practicalities of such an
approach? Would such a pro-active approach help
companies resolve conflicting stakeholder expec-
tations? Would it help them to tap into currently
underused sources of environmental expertise
that might be provided by certain stakeholders?
What would be the benefits and risks associated
with such an approach both for the company and
for the various stakeholder groups involved? Here
seems a fertile field for further research, which
should enrich our understanding of corporate
social performance.
It is difficult to compare the findings of our
study to the results obtained from studies in other
industries as these are often very differently
framed. Clearly the approach taken by our case
study companies was not as systematic as that
described by Sillanpää (1998) for the Body Shop,
but the Body Shop approach is probably not
typical for the cosmetics industry as a whole. Our
findings correspond in many respects to those
made by Fineman and Clarke (1996) in four U.K.
industries – food retailing, automotives, power
and chemicals – particularly in terms of
managers’ tendencies to ignore non-traditional
and potentially hostile stakeholders.
One important aspect of the relationship
between stakeholder influence and company
behaviour has not been addressed in this paper.
We have looked at the way in which managers
construct stakeholder importance but not at the
relationship between this perceived importance
and companies’ environmental performance.
Both Ullmann (1985) and Clarkson (1995)
suggest that there is a relationship between stake-
holder influence and corporate social perfor-
mance. This we have not tested. We found that
managers seem to attach more importance to
certain stakeholders, based on their perceived
power, legitimacy and urgency, and it is not
unreasonable to assume that they therefore
produce more actions to address the concerns of
those stakeholders considered as important. But
whether this translates into real environmental
improvements we do not know. Part of the
reason for this is that a company’s total environ-
mental performance is difficult to measure and
even more difficult to compare between compa-
nies. Nonetheless, future research could make a
useful contribution to our understanding of
stakeholder influence and corporate environ-
mental performance by studying this link more
explicitly.
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Appendix 1: List of respondents 
Resp Company Position Joined company Gender
No. before or after 
privatisation
01 Water 1 Group Environmental Director before M
02 000" Environmental Management System Officer before M
(Water & Sewerage)
03 000" Conservation Manager (Water & Sewerage) after M
04 000" Estates Manager (Water) n/a (div. always M
in private sector
05 000" Regional Manager, Production (Water & Sewerage) before M
06 000" Regional Middle Manager, Supply before M
(Water & Sewerage)
07 000" Director (Environmental Consulting Business) after M
08 000" Technical Control Manager (Waste Management) after M
09 Water 2 Environmental Information Manager (Group) before M
10 000" Director of Quality & Environment before M
(Water & Sewerage)
11 000" Environmental Co-ordinator (Water & Sewerage) before M
12 000" Sewage Treatment Manager (Water & Sewerage) before M
13 000" Facilities Manager (Water & Sewerage) before M
14 000" Regional Sales Manager (Water & Sewerage) after M
15 000" Manager, Supply (Water & Sewerage) before M
16 000" Customer Service Manager (Water & Sewerage) before F
17 Electricity 1 Group Director of Regulation before M
18 000" Group Environmental Manager before M
19 000" Group Legal Advisor before M
20 000" Director, Systems Division (Electricity Distribution) before M
21 000" Director (Property Division) after M
22 000" Operations Manager (Generation Division) before M
23 000" Central Sales & Special Markets Manager after M
(Electricity Supply)
24 000" Environment & Safety Co-ordinator before M
(Customer Services)
25 000" Site Services Manager before M
26 000" Environmental Co-ordinator, Systems before M
(Electricity Distribution)
27 000" Environmental Co-ordinator, Network Engineering before M
(Electricity Distribution)
28 000" Transport Manager before M
29 Electricity 2 Chief Executive Officer after M
30 000" Group Environmental Manager after F
31 000" Group Corporate Communications Manager nor known F
32 000" Customer Operations Manager before M
33 000" Health, Safety & Environment Manager before M
(Customer Operations)
34 000" Performance Standards Manager before M
(Electricity Distribution)
35 000" Estates Manager before M
Notes
* This article is based on a research project funded
by the Economic and Social Research Council’s
Global Environmental Change Programme, Grant No.
L 321 25 3209.
1 E.g. Interviews 1, 9, 10, 18, 20, 21, 22 30, 32, 34,
40, 42, 43, 57, 58.
2 Interviews 1, 10, 11, 20, 26, 27, 32, 34, 38, 41, 46,
56, 57, 59.
3 Interview 4. 
4 Interview 43.
5 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 29,
32, 35, 40, 42.
6 Interviews 18, 30, 42.
7 Interviews 9, 18, 30, 42.
8 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41,
42, 43, 46, 51, 55, 58, 59, 60.
9 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18,
20, 23, 29, 30, 32, 34, 42, 43, 45, 48, 51, 54, 56,
57, 58, 59.
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Appendix 1 (continued)
Resp Company Position Joined company Gender
No. before or after 
privatisation
36 Electricity 2 Divisional Environmental Co-ordinator before M
37 000" Waste Management Officer before M
38 000" Generation Manager after M
39 000" Manager (Technical Services Marketing and R&D) after M
40 Multi-utility 1 Group Technical Director before M
41 0000" Group Health, Safety and Environment Manager after M
42 0000" Group Environmental Advisor beforeF
43 0000" Environmental Co-ordinator (Water & Sewerage) before M
44 0000" Water Supply Director (Water & Sewerage) before M
45 0000" Waste Management Manager (Group) after M
46 0000" Waste Management Manager (Water & Sewerage) before F
47 0000" Conservation & Recreation Manager before M
(Water & Sewerage)
48 0000" Energy Services Manager (Electricity Supply) before M
49 0000" Quality Manager, Energy & Telecoms before M
(Electricity Supply)
50 0000" Environmental Co-ordinator, Energy and Telecoms before M
(Electricity Supply)
51 0000" Quality Manager (Electricity Distribution) before M
52 0000" Waste Recycling Officer (Facilities Management) before F
53 0000" Procurement Services Manager after M
54 0000" Waste Water Regional General Manager before M
(Water & Sewerage)
55 0000" Manager, Waste Management before M
(Electricity Distribution & Supply)
56 0000" Manager, Waste Management before M
(Electr. Distribution & Supply)
57 Multi-utility 2 Technical Director, Environment before M
(Water & Sewerage)
58 0000" Environmental Policy Co-ordinator before M
(Water & Sewerage)
59 0000" Water Resources Manager (Water & Sewerage) before M
60 0000" Conservation Officer (Water & Sewerage) before M
10 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 34, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43,
44, 45, 46, 52, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60.
11 Interviews 3, 4, 6, 17, 18, 19, 32, 41, 47, 59.
12 Interviews 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 22, 26, 27, 31, 32,
34, 38, 43, 46, 47, 52, 55, 56, 59.
13 Interviews 1, 7, 8, 14, 17, 18, 20, 28, 30, 31, 32,
40, 42, 43, 57.
14 Interviews 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20,
23, 30, 31, 35, 37, 41, 42, 43, 60.
15 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15,
16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 30, 31, 32, 36, 39, 42,
43, 44, 48, 50, 51, 56, 57, 58, 59.
16 Interviews 7, 18, 24, 28, 29, 30, 40, 41, 43, 49,
53.
17 Interviews 1, 2, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 20, 25, 31,
32, 38, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 58, 60.
18 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13,
17, 18, 20, 22, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38,
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 50, 54, 57, 58, 59,
60.
19 Interviews 4, 6, 9, 10, 14, 42, 43, 60.
20 Interviews 1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18, 19, 22, 30,
32, 34, 35, 42, 43, 57, 59.
21 Interviews 17, 18, 19.
22 Interviews 40, 43.
23 Interviews 1, 3, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 26, 27, 31,
32, 34, 37, 41, 43, 44, 46, 56, 57, 60.
24 Interviews 1, 3, 4, 8, 18, 22, 26, 34, 37, 57,
58, 59.
25 Interviews 18, 26.
26 Interview 1, 42.
27 Interviews 1, 8, 17, 20, 26, 30, 31, 32, 40, 43.
28 Interviews 18, 25, 32, 41.
29 Interviews 29, 30.
30 Interview 23.
31 Interviews 18, 23.
32 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20.
33 Interview 9.
34 Interviews 15, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30, 43.
35 Interviews 2, 3, 15, 40, 43, 57.
36 Interviews 1, 2, 9, 10, 17, 18, 20, 29, 30, 32, 43,
50, 51, 57, 58.
37 Interviews 3, 6, 12, 15, 18, 22, 36, 42, 43, 47,
49, 57, 58.
38 Interviews 57, 58.
39 Interviews 1, 9, 34, 40, 41.
40 Interviews 9, 34.
41 Interview 9.
42 Interviews 4, 6, 9, 10, 14, 42, 43, 60.
43 Interview 57.
44 Interviews 1, 2, 5, 9, 17, 20, 34, 57.
45 Interviews 1, 9, 54.
46 Interviews 17, 34, 42, 43.
47 Interviews 17, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 30, 34, 41, 42,
49, 51.
48 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 15, 41, 43, 44, 57, 58,
59.
49 Interviews 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 12, 41, 43, 45, 46, 54,
57, 58.
50 Interviews 1, 17, 30, 32, 40, 49.
51 Interviews 9, 16, 43.
52 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12, 17, 19, 20, 22, 26,
27, 28, 31, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 50, 51,
57, 58, 59.
53 Interviews 2, 10, 17, 20, 23, 34, 40, 43, 50.
54 Interviews 12, 14, 19, 22, 26, 34, 38, 41, 42, 43,
46.
55 Interviews 1, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 24, 26, 31,
41, 42, 58.
56 Interviews 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 37, 49, 51.
57 Interviews 2, 3, 6, 9, 11, 12, 15, 40, 41, 42, 43,
57, 58, 60.
58 Interviews 1, 2, 9, 10, 17, 18, 22, 30, 32, 34, 35,
58.
59 Interviews 1, 41, 54.
60 Interviews 1, 2.
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